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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

EDDIE I-IOOGLAND,
by his guardian ad litem,
Roelof Hoogland,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.THO~IAS

B. CHILD and C. W. CHILD,
dba THOMAS B. CHILD & CO.;
JA·CK ALDER and ROBERT R.
CHILD, dba ALDER-CHILD
CONSTRUCTION CO.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9295

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS JACK ALDER AND
ROBERT R. CHILD, dba ALDER CHILD
CONSTRU,CTION COMPANY

STATEMENT OF F A·CTS
The plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment
made and entered in favor of all of the defendants and
against the plaintiff, no cause of action. ( R. 88)
The record on appeal in this case consists of the
pleadings and material contained in the appeal cover
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and of the depositions of Eddie Hoogland, Roelof Hoogland and Louisa Hoogland, which are contained in a
separate folder, and of the depositions of Robert R. Child
and Thomas B. Child, \vhich are contained in another
folder. Each of the three documents contains its own
separate page numbering. Therefore, in our resume of
the facts where the record is referred to we will use the
letter "R"; where the Hoogland depositions are referred
to we -vvill use the letter ''H," and \\ here the ·Child depositions are referred to we will use the letter "C."
7

•

The incident out of which the plaintiff's injuries
arose occurred on the 18th day of February, 1957, (R. 2).
Thomas B. Child is the father of Robert R. Child,
(C. 37) However, they lived in separate homes and conducted separate businesses. Thomas B. Child \Yas a
mason contractor. Robert R. Child \vas a partner with
Jack Alder in the general construction business, doing
business under the name and style of Alder-Child Construction ~c·ompany, ( C 2, 3, 20). !Thomas B. Child resided
at 452 South 8th East, and to the rear of his premises
had a large lot on the south portion of \Yhich \Yere some
statues and the north portion of \vhich was used as a
storage yard in connection \vith his 1nason contracting
business.
The Alder-Child Company at that time did not have
a yard in whieh to store its material and had stored some
material on the premises of Thomas B. Child with his
consent. The material included one or perhaps two 53
gallon drums of Sealtex, a concrete curing compound
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which they had used on practically all of their building
jobs. There were no signs on the drum indicating that the
product \vas explosive, dangerous or flammable, and they
had never found it to be dangerous, explosive or flamrnable from their experience in using it, and had never
heard of any incidents where it had been found to be
flammable or dangerous, (R. 29-31; C. 4, 5). It had an
asphalt smell but did not smell like Benzine, and did not
give off fumes, (C. 6, 15).
Robert R. Child in his deposition testified that he
had never observed any holes in the fence surrounding
his father's p.remises, (C.17, 18), and had never seen
kids running through the yard or playing in it, (C. 19).
Reference is made in appellant's Brief to the fact
that Thomas B. ~c·hild stored dangerous acids upon his
premises. If so, the answer to this is that the accident
\Yas not caused by any contact with dangerous acid.
At the time of the accident the plaintiff minor, Eddie
Hoogland, was 14 years of age, (H. 3). He and his
parents had lived in this country a little over 4 years,
(H. 3). He "\Vas a student in the 7th grade at the Webster
School and would have attended junior high school the
next year, (H. 4). On the day of the accident he had
sloughed at least a part of his school and in the afternoon
had gone on to the premises of the O.P. Skaggs Store
\vhich adjoins the Thomas B. Child property on the north,
(H. 5). In order to get onto the Child premises he had to
squeeze through a small place between a fence and a
building, (H.11, 20, 21). The only reason he gave for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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going on the premises was that he liked the place, "the
rocks and that," (H. 10). He had gone on the premises
before and played upon some machinery located thereon,
(H. 5, 12). On the date in question he built a fire about
a foot in diameter and had a flame shooting up about 2
feet high. This fire burned for about 8 or 9 minutes and
was within a foot of a stack of lumber near which the
barrel of Sealtex, owned by the defendant, Alder-·Child
Construction Company, was stored. Eddie Hoogland
allegedly put this fire out, (H. 27, 29), and then made a
torch (H. 29) out of a stick which \vas about as long as
his ar1n and around which he wrapped a piece of cloth
with black stuff on it, which cloth he found on the premises. It did not at first burn very much until he re-wound
the cloth. It then really burned and shot up a flame
of about a foot or a foot and a half. He had this torch
going for about 5 minutes, (H. 14, 15-23, 24). This torch
was burning within one and one-half feet of the stack of
lumber, (H. 23, 24). Eddie then placed the torch on the
ground and allegedly put the flame out with some sand,
but the torch continued to smoke, (H. 24, 25). Prior to
this, Eddie had sat on a piece of machinery located on
the pre1nises (H. 29), and it 'vas not until after that
that he directed his attention to the dru1n. When he vvent
to the drum, he thought that "there might be something
dangerous in it," but he didn't know, (H. 30). He had not
observed the drum containing the Sealtex until after he
was on the premises, (H. 5). He had seen drums like these
before, " The stuff inside they use for road oil," (H. 17,
1

18). After observing the barrel and thinking there might
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be so1nething dangerous in it, he lit a Inatch and held it
over an opening in the barrel, and then saw some shiny
black stuff. He then knew it was dangerous and 'vanted
to put the n1atch out, but before he could do so, the barrel
exploded, (H. 30).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MO'TION FOR SUMl\1ARY JUDGMENT.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANTS ALDER & CHILD WERE NOT LIABLE TO TI-IE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE PLAYGRO·UND
DOCTRINE.
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANTS ALDER & CHILD AS A l\1:ATTER
OF LA "'VV WERE NOT LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER
THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE.
THE INSTRUMENTALITY WHICH INJURES THE
CHILD MUST ITSELF BE SO ATTRACTIVE 'TO CHILDREN
OF IMMATURE YEARS THAT ITS EXISTENCE OR MAIN·TENANCE ON THE OWNER'S PREMISES MUST CONSTITUTE AN IMPLIED INVITATION TO CHILDREN OR PERSONS OF IMMATURE YEARS TO ENTER THE PREr~1ISES
WHICH THE OWNER IN ·THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE
CARE COULD FORESEE.
(a)

(b) THE INSTRUMENTALITY ITSELF MUST BE INHERENTLY DANGERO·US AND SUCH DANGEROUS CONDITION MUST BE KNOWN 'TO THE OWNER.
THE INSTRUMENTALITY MUST HAVE BEEN
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDEN'T AND RESULTING INJURY.
(c)
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(d) THE DOCTRINE IN ANY EVENT CAN ONLY
APPLY TO CHILDREN OF TENDER AND IMMATURE
YEARS.
POINIT IV.
THE ACCIDENT AS A MATTER OF LAW WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AND CARELESSNESS OF THE PLAINTIFF MINOR.
POINT V.
THE PLAINTIFF MINOR WAS A TRESPASSER AS TO
WHOM THE DEFENDANTS OWED NO DUTY EXCEPT AS
NOT 'TO WILFULLY CAUSE ANY INJURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOITION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The motion for summary judgment was based
upon the depositions of the plaintiff minor and his parents, Roelof Hoogland and Louisa Hoogland and the
depositions of Thomas B. Child and Robert R. Child and
also upon the affidavit of Robert R. Child, which said
depositions and affidavit 'vere before the court and are
a part of this record on appeal. The only counter-affidavit filed in the case was that of the plaintiff's attorney, Gordon Hyde (R. 76-79), in which affidavit, among
other things, the affiant Hyde claims that the Sealtex
compound involved in the suit emitted explosive fumes
which should have been known to the defendants, and
that said compound is known in the industry to be made
pliable and plastic by reason of volatile substances. No
affidavit was filed by any member of the so-called inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dustry or by anyone claiming to have any kno\vledge
of the product, that it was either explosive or volatile.
There was nothing in the affidavit to show that Mr.
llyde had any p·ersonal knowledge of the matters on
'vhich he was attempting to testify or that he was competent to testify concerning the same. This affidavit
wholly failed to co1nply with Rule 56 (e) of the Utah
Rules of ·Civil Procedure and for that reason is wholly
ineffectual. Rule 56 (e) reads as follows :
~'Supporting

and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as vvould he admissible in evidence, and
shall show affi'rmatively that the aff~ant is competent to testify to the rnatter s stated therein. Sworn
or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to he supplemented or opposed by depositions or by further affidavits." (Italics ours.)
Hyde's affidavit is nothing more or less than a statement of what he might hope to prove and is not such an
affidavit as is contemplated or required by the rules.
Rule 56 (c) provides that the adverse party prior
to the day of the hearing may serve opposing affidavits,
and Rule 56 (f) provides that should it appear from
the affidavit of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opp.osition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance
to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had. In this connection, there
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was no affidavit presented by plaintiff's counsel stating
that he could not obtain affidavits from persons essential
to justify his opposition. If a moving party by affidavit
or otherwise presents materials which would require a
directed verdict in his favor, if presented at the trial,
he is then entitled to a summary judgment, ~unless the
opposing party e~ther shows that affidavits are then
unavavlable to him, or comes forward w~th some materials
by affidavit or otherwise that show there i·s a tr~able issue
of a mater~al fact. 6 }foore Federal Practice, p. 2071,
Sec. 56.11 ( 3).
It was clearly established by the depositions and
affidavit of Robert R. Child that the Sealtex was not
marked explosive and contained no markings to indicate
that it was volatile or dangerous. Eiis deposition and
affidavit further indicated that the pToduct had been
widely used by them and had never been found to be
volatile, explosive or dangerous, and they had heard of
no incidents of any danger involving the use or storage
of said product. The very purpose of the summary
judgment procedure is to require the plaintiff to con1e
forward with affidavits contradicting, if possible, the
facts set forth in the affidavit of the n1oving party. If
the connnercial product, Sealtex, was dispensed in containers rnarked dangerous, volatile or explosive, it 'vas
incu1nbent upon the plaintiff to produce affidavits to
this effect frorn parties in a position to lmow, or if said
product was claimed to be volatile or explosive, it was
incumbent to obtain such information by affidavit from
competent persons qualified to do so. In the absence of
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such opposing affidavits, there was no triable issue and
the court could hardly have done else than find that the
Sealtex 'vas not an tmusual or extraordinary thing; that
it 'vas not volatile, explosive or dangerous, was not so
1narked, and that the defendants, Alder & Child, had no
reason to know or suspect that someone might be injured
through coining in contact with it. The plaintiff minor by
his own testimony admitted that the Sealtex had not attracted him on the pren1ises, and it was not until after he
had entered the premises and played thereon, that he
even observed the drun1. Plaintiff's own testimony indicated that he used the Sealtex in an extraordinary and
unexpected way and that he knew the Sealtex 1night be
dangerous before he ever lit the match thereto. The court
properly granted the motion for summary judgment.
This will be covered more fully in our argument under
I>oints II, III, IV and V.
This court has held that depositions are a proper
basis on \Yhich to support a motion for summary judgment. See Tempest v. Richardson, 299 Pac. (2d) 124,
5 Utah (2d) 174.
Plaintiff complains that summary judgment is a
drastic remedy and only to be used sparingly; however,
as indicated by Judge 'Crockett in Richards v. And~erson,
9 lTtah (2d) 17, 337 Pac. (2d) 59:

"* * * It is true that summary judgment is a
severe measure which courts should be reluctant
to use, and that doubts should be resolved in favor
of allowing a full trial of the case. Yet it does
have the salutary purpose of not requi·ring the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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time, trouble and expense of trial, when the best
showing the plaintiff could make would not entitle
him to recover under the law." (Italics ours)
The best showing made by the plaintiff at the pretrial hearing failed to disclose any competent evidence
indicating negligence on the part of Alder-Child or anything upon which liability as against them could be
founded. The court properly granted the summary judgment.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANTS ALD.ER & CHILD WERE NOT LIABLE ·TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE PLAYGROUND
DOCTRINE.

In his argument under this phase of the case plaintiff's counsel concedes that before the doctrine could in
any event apply, at least two things must be present:
(1) The premises must either have been a playground
or known to be a place where children habitually played;
and (2) The defendants must have maintained a dangerous condition on said premises of which no '\Varning was
g:tven.
The evidence on which the sum1nary judgment '\vas
based clearly indicated that Thomas B. Child's home was
located at 452 South 8th East; that he was a mason contractor and that to the rear of his home he had a lot on
which he stored scaffolding and other materials. He also
had a shed which housed some of his tools. It was all
fenced and could not be reached except through two gates
which were generally not locked, or unless a person
climbed over the fence. The fence varied in height from
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4 t~> 6 feet. There were no openings in it, (C. 20, 21). He
did not let children play in his yard, but on occasion had
chased them out whenever he saw them there. This was
not a lot of times, ('C. 22, 23). l-Ie had erected some
statues on his lot, to the south of the storage area, (C. 24)
which rnight be interesting to adults, but not to children.
He had never permitted children to come upon said
pre1nises to see such statues unless accompanied by
gro\\rnups, (C. 26). If he ever noticed any openings or
da1nage to the fencing, he repaired it, (C. 33). On the
north end the fence did go against some sheds, and on
occasion the children had made an opening between the
shed and the fence and he had repaired such opening
'vhenever he observed it, (C. 34). 1-Ie had never had
any accident occur before in his yard, (C. 36·).

The only evidence in this case indicates that Thomas
B. Child did not per1nit his yard to be used as a playground and that as a matter of fact it was not so used;
that he took all reasonable precautions to keep children
out of his yard. The owner does not have a duty at his
peril of keeping children off his property. We submit
that in this case Thomas B. Child did all that was required
of him in keeping the property fenced and ordering children therefrom when he saw them on the property. It
"\Yas not his duty to make a trespass by children impossible. See T,aylor v. Minneapolis & St. Lo~tis R.R. Co.,
(Io,va) 163 N.W. 405, O'Conner v. Ill. C.R. Co., (La.) 10
So. 678, Grube v.

Balt~more

(Md.) 103 A. 948.

If there should be any conceivable issue of a playSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ground by Thomas B. Child, there is certainly no issue
of the same as to Child and Alder. They never knew of
any holes in the fences surrounding the premises, had
never seen kids running through the yard or playing in
it, and there is nothing to indicate that Alder or Child
had any kno,vledge of any use of said premises by children, and they could not, therefore, be held liable under
the theory that the pren1ises 'vere used as a playground.
Certainly, they did not own the premises and were not
using them as a playground in any event.
In the second place, the defendants did not store
a dangerous or explosive product upon the premises.
The Utah Supreme ·Court in the case of Bogdon v. Los
Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Co., 59 lTtah 505, 205
Pac. 571, had occasion to consider the question of explosive or dangerous substances, and in the course of the
opinion stated:

"* * * It is only where a highly explosive substance or other dangerous instrumentality is knowingly placed in a public place where people, including children, have a right to be, or "There such a
substance or instrumentality or agency is lrnowingly placed or left 'in the 'Yay that he (the owner)
knows the licensee - a child of tender years is habitually .accustomed to go, and where an
ordinarily prudent person would reasonably expect him to go, and be thereby injured,' that creates liability. * * *." (Italics contained in opinion)
A review of a nun1ber of explosive cases is set forth
In that opinion, following which the Supreme Court
stated:
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"There i~ not a single case that has been cited
\vhere the explosive was not kno,vingly stored or
left at a place which was either a public place, or
where it was knovvn that children had a right to
go, and where they ordinarily did go, or the place
vvhere the explosive \vas stored or placed was one
to which children had access and to which any
person of ordinary prudence and intelligence
would reasonably expect that children would go
and rnight suffer injury. In this cas~e, however,
the undisp~tted evidence is to the effect that the
defendant did not know that there was any powd.er
in the car. Nat being cognizant of that fact, it
could not guard against the acci'dent. * * *"
(Italics ours)
Since in that case the defendant did not kno\V that
the po,vder "\-Vas left in the car by the consignee, the court
held that under the undisputed facts the case was not
brought \vithin the doctrine of storing dangerous explosives on the o\vner's pren1ises or at places where persons
including children are known to go or near \vhich they
habitually pass. Again, the court said:
'~

* * * We are here dealing with a case where

the defendant is sought to be held liable upon the
ground that it was guilty of negligence in not
anticipating a danger when the evidence shows
that it had neither the knowledge, nor sufficient
time to acquire kno\vledge, that there was any
danger.
"While the accident was an unfortunate one,
yet it was one which the defendant could not have
foreseen, and therefore cannot legally be held liable for. In the conduct of modern business enterprises, accidents will, and of necessity must, hapSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pen. The law, however, does not impose liability
unless the party charged with negligence could by
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence have
prevented the accident. Although children of tender years are favored by the law, yet, even before
one of them can recover for an injury, it must
appear that the person causing the injury o\ved
a duty to the injured child, and that he negligently
failed to discharge that duty by failing to exercise
that degree of care that the law imposed under the
circurnstances. It goes without saying that one
cannot discharge a duty before it is known to exist,
and while actual knowledge of its existence is not
always necessary, yet the facts must be such that
knowledge may be imputed upon the ground that
the person charged by the exercise of reasonable
care ought to have kno\\m, and hence, in contemplation of lavv, did know. The undisputed facts in
this case are not such as will impute knowledge
to the defendant."
In the instant case the evidence is uncontradicted that
none of the defendants kne\v that there \Yas any explosive
or dangerous -condition in connection \Yith the storing of
the Sealtex.. The experience of the defendants Alder and
Child was exactly to the contrary. There was nothing
on which to place them upon notice of any explosive or
dangerous qualities, and indeed, as hereafter indicated
under point III (b), the Sealtex \Yas not inherently dangerous in and of itself. The evidence is also positive that
the Sealtex was not stored in a public place and at least
so far as the defendants Alder and Child are concerned,
it was not stored in a place 'vhere children had a right
to go or where they or either of them lmew that they
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ordinarily did go or to 'vhich children had access. Accordingly, under the decision of the Bogdon case there
could be no liability as to the defendants Alder and Child
under this particular phase of the matter.
See also St. Lo1tis l.M. & S.R. Co. v. Wagoner, (Ark.)
166 S.W. 948.- In that case an empty alcohol barrel had
been shipped over the defendant's railroad and unloaded
at its destination wheTe it was placed on the station
platform by the defendant's employee. The weigh bill
did not show that the barrel had inflammables in it and
there was nothing to call the receiving agent's attention
to the barrel as having explosives in it or as being dangerous. 'Two boys accompanied their parents to the
railroad station, and while the father was in the waiting
room, the boys played on the platform around the empty
barrel. A one-half inch cork stopped in a hole at the end
of the barrel protruded about one-half inch out of the
hole and when pulled out, made a hissing sound. The boys
"\vould blow their breath in the barrel, and it would blow
back on them. One of the boys struck a match and started
to stick it in the barrel when an explosion occurred, causing injury to both boys. The father brought suit in his
O"\Vn behalf and as next friend, alleging negligence on the
part of the defendant in leaving the barrel on a platform
"\vhere children were accustomed to play. Defendant's request for instructions that the plaintiffs were bare licensees and for a directed verdict were refused, as was
also a request for instruction that the lighting of the
match "\vas the proximate cause of the injuries and for
a directed verdict. In that case on appeal the appellate
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court held that the doctrine of attractive nuisance did not
apply and there was no evidence to support the verdict.
In Galloway v. Texas Canst. Co. (La.) 150 So. 103,
plaintiff sought to recover for injuries to t\vo 12-year-old
boys \\ ho were injured "\vhen a companion thre·w. a firecracker into a bung hole of an e1npty paint drun1 \Yhich
the defendant had deposited in the plaintiff's backyard
at the request of a boarder. The drum had been practically emptied of paint, but contained gases ''Thich exploded when the firecracker \vas placed in the hole. In
affir1ning a judgment of dis1nissal, the court said:
7

"* * * There is no evidence to sho\v that a
paint drum "\vith a small amount of paint in the
bottom is inherently or intrinsically dangerous.
It is not to be sup·posed that a person could reasonably anticipate that fire-crackers \vould be thro\vn
into the drum through the bung-hole."
In appellant's brief it is sought to charge Robert R.
Child on the theory that he was a civil engineer and
therefore should have known the che1nical c.ontent of the
Sealtex. The fact of the matter is that Robert R. Child
took, but did not complete, a civil engineering course at
the University of Utah, took a general one year course
in Chemistry, but had no idea \vhat Sealtex \vas made of.
He knew it emitted no fumes, (C. 10, 11, 4). He knew
his men smoked \vhile applying it. He knew it was unnecessary to ventilate when applying it indoors, (C. 5).
It did not smell like road asphalt, but like e1nulsion asphalt, and he had no idea what the chemical content of
it was, (·C. 5, 6, 15).
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There can be no recovery under the playground doetrine in the third place because that doctrine 'vould only
apply to children of tender years. The plaintiff minor
'vas 1-l: years of age at the time of the accident and was
not a person of tender years to whom the doctrine could
apply. See cases cited under Point III (d).
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANTS ALDER & CHILD AS A MATTER
OF LAW WERE NOT LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER
·THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE.

This court in numerous cases has considered the doetrine of attractive nuisance. Judge McDonough in the
case of Davis v. Provo CiJty Corporation, 1 Utah (2d)
2-±4, 265 Pac. ( 2d) 415, states that the "doctrine merely
sets a standard of care toward trespassers incumbent
upon a possessor of property in the use of such property.
lie has a duty to take safety precautions, where, by
reason of its attractiveness, he has notice that children
"~in come upon his property in proximity to a dangerous
condition or instrumentality."
As stated in Peterson v. Farmers' Grain & llfillivng
Co., 69 Utah 395, 255 Pac. 436:
"This doctrine is to the general effect that
under certain circumstances it is actionable negligence to leave on one's premises an unguarded
dangerous thtng, to which children are likely to
be attracted for sport or play. This rule of li,ability is subject to ntttmerous limitations, and 'needs
very careful statement not to make it an unjust
and impract~cable requirem.ent,' and 'the principle,
if accepted, must be oau,tiously applie~d.' United
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Zinc & ·Chemical ·Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 S.
Ct. 299, 66 L. Ed. 615, 36 A.L.R. 28. The subject
has been before this court in at least five cases.
* * * In one of these cases only was liability upheld. In the other four it was denied." (Italics
OUTS.)

As stated by Judge Straup in Smalley v. Rio Grande
vV estern Rai.Zroad, 34 U t~h 423, 98 Pac. 311 :
"The doctrine underlying the 'turntable' cases
is that the leaving or maintaining of a dangerous
and attractive machine, or other instrument or
agency, upon one's premises_, under circumstances
"\vhich naturally tend to attract or allure young
children of immature judgment, and to induce
them to believe that they are at liberty to enter
and handle or play with it, is tantamount to an
implied invitation to enter." (Italics ours.)
In Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 455, 131 Pac.
901, the court quotes with approval from Payne v. UtahIdaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598,221 Pac. 568:
"As pointed out by this court both in the
Brown case and again in the case of Smalley v.
Railroad, 34 Utah 447, 448, 98 Pac. 311, a thing
may be attractive or alluring to children and be
inherently dangerous and yet not fall within the
principle governing the turntable cases. Again,
a thing may be attractive, but whether it is also
dangerous may be a question of fact; or it may
be both attractive and dangerous and yet not be
the proximate cause of the injury complained of;
or, although attractive and dangerous, it maynevertheless be common and natural and of a
character that makes it impracticable to be guarded against. In all such cases the thing, whatever
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it may be, lacks the element which controls the
doctrine of the turntable cases, namely, that to
ntaintain it in an unprotected or unguarded condition constitutes it an attractive and dangerous
nuisance. * * *"
See also Christi,ansen v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake
Railroad Co., 77 Utah 85, 291 Pac. 926, wherein a quotation fro1n Bogdon v. Los Angeles & Sa.lt Lake Railroad
Co., 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 571, is cited with approval:
"Although children of t~ender years are
favored by the law, yet, even before one of them
can recover for an injury, it must: appea,r thal the
person causing the injury owed a duty to the injured child, and that he negligently failed to discharge that duty by failing to exercise that degree
of care that the law imposed under the circumstances. It goes wi:thout saying that one cannot
discharge a duty before it is known to exiJst, and
"\\Thile actual knowledge of its existence is not alvvays necessary, yet the facts must be such that
knowledge may be imputed upon the ground that
the person charged by the exercise of reasonable
care ought to have known, and hence, in contemplation of law, did know. The undisputed facts in
this case are not such as will impute knowledge to
the defendant." (Italics ours.)
The above and foregoing authorities indicate that
before the doctrine applies, the following must be established: (1) The instrumentality which injures the child
must itself be so attractive to children of immature years
that its existence or maintenance on the owner's premises
must constitute an implied invitation to children or persons of immature years to enter the premises which the
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owner in the exercise of reasonable care could foresee;
(2) The instrumentality itself must be inherently dangerous and such dangerous condition must be known to the
owner; ( 3) ~The instrumentality must have been the proximate cause of the accident and resulting injury; (4) The
doctrine in any event can only apply to children of tender
and immature years.
THE IN"STRUMENTALITY WHICH INJURES THE
CHILD MUST ITSELF BE SO ATTRACTIVE 'TO CHILDREN
OF IMMATURE YEARS THAT ITS EXISTEN·CE OR MAIN·TENAN'CE ON THE OWNER'S PREMISES MUST CONSTITUTE AN IMPLIED INVITATION TO CHILDREN OR PERSONS OF IMMATURE YEARS TO ENTER THE PREMISES
WHICH THE OWNER IN 'THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE
CARE COULD FORESEE.
(a)

The drums in question were not unusual or out of the
ordinary. They were composed of black metal with no
markings on the outside thereof to indicate that the contents were flammable, explosive or dangerous. They
could have contained water or any number of substances.
They were common place and of the type frequently seen
around service stations and used as trash containers.
There was nothing about the drums then1selves which
would lead an ordinary reasonable and prudent person
to suspect that they would he attractive to children. Furthermore, the plaintiff minor was not attracted to the
barrels beeause he did not even know that the barrels
were on the pre1nises until after he had entered the same.
lie had not been attracted to the premises by the barrels
in any event, but by the rocks and 1nachines which he had
seen on the pren1ises and on which he had played. It was
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not until after he had entered the premises, played on
the Inachines and built a fire on the day of the accident
that he paid any attention at all to the barrel or its contents.
See Bogdon v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad
Co., 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 571. In that case a 1ninor went
upon a railroad right of way looking for sheep, and \Yhile
there, collected from the floor of a railroad car soxne
powder \Vhich he exploded, causing severe burns to hiinself. The Supreme Court held that the powder did not
entice the minor upon the railroad premises so as to render the railroad company liable under the attractive nuisance doctrine. The car had been unloaded by the povvder co1npany, to \vhom it was consigned, and there was no
evidence that the railroad or its agents had any kno\vledge that there was any powder left in the car. The plaintiff had no knowledge until he got to the premises and
entered the car, and the Sup·reme Court held that:
"The plaintiff, therefore, could not have been
lured or attracted to the depot grounds of the
defendant or to the car in question through any
knowledge that there was powder in the car."
See also Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598,
221 Pac. 568. That case involved a sugar dump which had
been constructed on the defendant's premises and which
to defendant's knowledge had on occasions been used as
a sleigh-riding hill. At the time of the accident the minor
swung on an overhead cable, causing it to come off its
pulley and in attempting to put it back on its pulley,
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tric wire over which the defendant had no supervision,
and which caused the damages for which the recovery
was sought. In denying the application of the doctrine,
the Supreme Court said:

"* * * As to him the loose hanging cables did
not constitute an attraction, for with apparent
deliberation he chose not to use the cables for the
purpose of sliding down them, as his associate
did a few moments before the accident. Not until
his companion had discovered that the cable had
come off the pulley and not until his companion
had failed in his efforts to replace it did the plaintiff concern himself with the cable at all. And
then, when he did concern himself with it, he did
with the cable that which the defendant certainly
could never have anticipated that he or any other
boy or girl would do with it. He swung it outward in an attempt to flip it back upon its pulley,
and swung it so far that it came in contact with
the electric wire of the power line, over which the
defendant had no sup·ervision or control, and
which, was outside of the right of way upon which
defendant's structure was built. It certainly cannot be said that hvs conduct was that of a child
of immature years attract.ed to a dangerous instrumentality maintained by the defend.ant, so as
to bring him wi~thin the doctrtne of the decis~ons of
thvs court herein before referred to. Nor can vt be
said that the circumstances of the accident were
such that the defendant might reasonably have
.antiJcipat~ed them, and so have been required to
guard against them. The comment of this court
in the case of Bogdon v. Railroad, supra, is equally
applicable here :
'There is * * * nothing in this case which
would authorize a finding that the plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
was enticed, lured, or attracted by anything
the defendant did or omitted to do to the car
(structure) in question, and hence the case
clearly and manifestly does not come within
the doctrine of the turntable cases or that of
attractive nuisances.'
"The plaintiff was not attracted to the structure by reason of the loose hanging cables, and
'vhen he reached the structure he was not attracted
to them by any appeal that they made to his childish instincts. There is no evidence that any other
child at any time was attracted by and amused
itself with the -cables, except that it does appear
that plaintiff's companion safely slid down one
of the cables immediately before the accident, and
there is not the slightest suggestion in the· evidence
that sliding down the cables was at all dangerous.
At any rate, the plaintiff w·as not attract:ed by the
cable as a thing to sliJde .down upon, nor was he
t"njwred in so doing. He was not injure1d untvl
he made use of the cable in a most unusual and
·extraordinary way, and used it in such a uJay
that i~t cannot possibly be said that the defendant
might have reasonably anticipate~d such use."
(Italics ours.)
As indicated in the Payne case, it cannot be said that
the plaintiff minor was attracted to the drum, nor was he
injured until he made use of the drum in a most unusual
and extraordinary way, to-wit: Attempting to set a fire
about it or in it and in such a way that it could not possibly be said that the defendants Alde-r and Child might
reasonably have anticipated such use.
See also Hayko v. Colorado and Utah Coal Company,
(Colo.) 235 Pac. 373. In that case the plaintiff, a 10 year
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old boy, with a playmate entered a shack- on the defendant's p,remises and took from the shack a box of dynamite
caps and while trying to prick out the contents of one of
them with a pin, the cap exploded, injuring him. The
back of the shack but not the open door could be seen
from nearby where people usually passed. In denying
the application, the Colorado Supreme Court said:
"The defendant makes several ansV\'ers. One
of them, which we think is sufficient, may be stated
thus: The plaintiff was a trespasser to whom
there was owing no duty, unless under the attractive nuisance doctrine ; that the negligence under
said doctrine consists in n1aintaining an attraction
which entices to trespass, not merely entices one
after he has become a trespasser; that plaintiff
could not see the box of caps till he had trespassed;
that therefore the caps cannot be classed as the
attraction; that the attractive agency must be an
unusual thing, of unusual attraction, not an ordinary thing; and that the shack was usual and ordinary, and so, as a matter of la,v, cannot be considered as an attraction to trespass."
So, also, under the present case the drm11 upon the defendant's pren1ises was not an unusual and extraordinary
thing, and, as we have heretofore indicated, it ·wras only
after the plaintiff entered the pre1nises for other things
which he observed that he became attracted to the barrel
and put it to an unusual and extraordinary use 'vhich
could not have been anticipated by the defendants.
(b) THE INSTRUMENTALITY ITSELF MUST BE INHERENTLY DANGERO,US AND SUCH DANGEROUS CONDITION MUST BE KNOWN TO THE OWNER.
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The Sealtex stored on the pre1nises was not dangerous, or, if so, was not kno,Yn or in the. exercise of due
care could not have been knovvn to be dangerous by the
defendants Alder and Child. The Sealtex was a commercial product sold in the 53 gallon drum vvith no indication
thereon that the product was flammable, dangerous or
explosive. It had been extensively used by Alder-Child
Co1npany in their construction activities and had never
been known b~T the1n to be dangerous, explosive or flarnlnable, and they had never heard of any fire, danger or
explosion involving the use of said product.
See Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598, 221
Pac. 568, where the court said:
"Under the evidence, we believe that the structure involved here was not shown to be either
novel in character or attractive or dangerous to
children, within the meaning of the Utah cases.
It was no more novel in character than a cattle
loading chute or a water tank upon a railroad
right of vvay, and is not shown to have been any
more attractive or dangerous than such structures
1night be. Even though we assume that it was attractive as a coasting place, or a place over which
to race horses, that it had been so used by children,
and that the defendant was charged with notice
that it was attractive to boys and girls for such
purposes, still there is not the slightest suggestion
in the evidence that the structure was at all dangerous when so used. The injury susta~ned by the
plaintiff was from a use whvch no reasonable man
could or would have anticipated, and from a use
to which no child vs shown to have theretofore
put it." (Italics ours.)
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In the case of Bogdon v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake
R~ailroad Co., 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 571, supra, p. 12, the
Utah Supreme Court indicates that the dangerous substance must be known to the defendant.
In the instant case the Sealtex was not marked as
flammable, dangerous or explosive, was not known by
experience to be of that character, and the defendants
Alder and Child in their operations had never known it
or found it to be of such a character. The defendants
Alder and Child could not reasonably have anticipated
the use which the plaintiff minor attempted to make of
the barrel, to-wit: putting a lighted match or setting fire
to the contents of the barrel, which was the thing that
caused the explosion or fire. The barrel itself and its contents were not inherently dangerous to children within the
meaning of the Utah cases.
See also Burley v. ]j([ cDowell, (Colo.) 298 Pac. (2d)
399. In that case damages were sought on behalf of a 9
year old boy, who, while playing with the defendant's
child on the defendant's premises, \Yas burned when gasoline, which the boys had unauthorizedly pTocured from a
building on the premises, was ignited by candle on a toy
boat. Judgment was rendered for the defendants, from
which the plaintiff took an appeal. The Supreme Court
held that the defendants in keeping gasoline for lawful
and reasonable purposes in place \vhere the boy had been
directed not to go were not guilty of negligence and could
not be held to duty to have anticipated the boy's action.
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Among other things, the court said the fact that the
defendants"kept a small quantity of gasoline mixed with oil
in a place other than the residence, and did not
reasonably anticipate that a nine year old boy,
knowing the explosive quality of the mixture,
would go where he had been forbidden and obtain
some of this mixture to be used in connection with
a lighted candle, *** We agree with the conclusions of the trial court that this was an unfortunate accident, and in fairness and justice to defendants, there is no act to vvhich the court can attach
negligence in failing to do what ordinary, prudent
persons would do in the maintenance of their
premises, \Vhere the minor, as an invitee, became
a trespasser. Defendants cannot be held to anticipate such actions as were here indulged by the
minor."
See also LeDuc v. Detroit Edi,son (Mich.) 235 N.W.
83~, in which the court held that the attractive nuisance
doctrine was not applicable to permit a recovery for the
death of a six year old boy. In that case a vacant lot had
been used by children as a playground for many years,
during which time they had cut and burned weeds. The
defendant had been working nearby doing some street
repairs, and on the week-end left a work cart containing
a gasoline tank on a parkway on the same side of the
street as the lot, the faucet being locked with a key similar
to that of a house water tap key. Over the week-end 15
or 20 boys, ranging in ages from 14 years down, started
pulling and burning weeds in the lot. One of them got a
water tap key, unlocked the faucet on the cart and got
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some gasoline from it to aid the burning. As a 10 year
old boy came toward the fire with a can of gasoline, a
14 year old boy attempted to take it from him. In the
struggle gasoline was spilled on the decedent, who had
come up with a burning match, but who had taken no part
in the struggle. He received burns which caused his death.
The court held that the cart did not constitute an attractive nuisance; that the children were not attracted to the
cart in play, nor did the train of events which led to the
injury start from a spontaneous and irresponsible taking
of an enticing object.
See also Dahl v. Valley Dredging Co. (~linn.) 145
N.W. 796. In that case a 7 year old boy while playing
with his brothers, ages 9 and 13, about the defendant's
dredging machine, was burned when one of the older boys
applied a match to some 'vaste and poured on some naptha kept in a coffee pot and used by the defendant in
starting the machine. The 1finnesota court refused to
apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, p·ointing out that
it is a matter of conunon knowledge that both kerosine and
gasoline are usually kept in the majority of households
and are seldom guarded so that children cannot get possession of them; that these liquids are not naturally attractive to children and are dangerous only "~hen brought
into contact with fire.
See also Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corporation, 19 N.E.
(2d) 981, in "rhich the New York Court of Appeals stated
the question as follows:
''The question presented is 'vhether want of
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care may be attributed to a business man in the
daily eonduct of his business under the following
circumstances: Upon the premises of defendant
a drip can is left under the faucet of a gasoline
drum from which gasoline is taken daily for the
refueling of gasoline engines. Two boys trespass
upon these premises after the close of business
and in the night time, steal the drip· can half full of
gasoline, take it away from the property of defendant out into the street, and there attempt to thro\v
it upon a fire theretofore started by these boys
and others, causing the ignition of the gasoline.
The infant plaintiff, a boy of ten, while walking
along the street, stopped to look at the fire and,
in attempting to run past the fire, tripped and fell
into the fire, thereby sustaining the injuries for
which suit is brought."
The case vvas submitted to a jur~r and a verdict for the
plaintiff returned on both theories of negligence and
nuisance. The judgment was reversed on both grounds.
The ground of negligence was on the theory that the defendant kne\v that children were accustomed to play in
and about the premises, and that under these circumstances it was negligent for the defendant to leave a
can exposed underneath the spicket to collect the gasoline drippings. The court, a1nong other things, stated:
"While highly inflammable, the use of gasoline does not place the case at bar within the exception concerning the use of inherently dangerous
materials."
See also to the same effect Beickert v. G. M. Laboratories (N.Y.) 151 N.E. 195. In that case an infant plaintiff was burned by the igniting of some pieces of film
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which another boy had picked up in the rear of the defendant's plant. An employee had attempted to burn some
old film, but in the process some of the pieces had escaped
into the air and come down onto the lot. A child picked
up some of the loose pieces and while lighting a match
to it, an explosion occurred and he was burned. At the
close of the plaintiff's 'case the judgment was entered
for the defendant which on appeal was affirmed. The
New York court said that the films themselves were not
inherently dangerous unless brought in contact with fire.
See also Hall v. N~tv York Telephone Company,
(N.Y.) 108 N.E. 182, in which it was held that a bottle
of denatured alcohol was not an inherently dangerous
substance.
See also Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93
Pac. 570, in which it was said that common objects should
be held as a matter of law not to be within the rule, although they may have some attraction for children and
expose them to some danger.
See Martin v. Northern P. R. (Mont.) 149 Pac. 89,
wherein it was held that the owner must know that the
device or object is usually dangerous and alluring to children of tender years and that such children were or were
likely to be attracted to it.
THE INSTRUMENTALITY MUST HAVE BEEN
THE PROXIMA'TE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND RESULTING INJURY.
(c)

In Charvoz v. Salt Lake CiJty, 42 Utah 455, 131 Pac.
901, supra, page 18, the Utah Supre1ne Court held that
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the attractiveness must be shown to have been the proxiInate cause of the child's injury. This was also the ruling
of the 1Ttah Supreme Court in the case of Bogdon v. Los
Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Co., 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac.
371, supra, page 12. As we have heretofore seen, the
thing which attracted the plaintiff on the premises in the
first place was not the barrel, and, therefore, the attractiveness was not and could not be considered the proxiInate 'cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See also cases cited
under voint II.
See also Anderson v. Karstens, 218 Ill. Appeal 285.
In that case the defendant, a cement contractor, used a
garage and vacant lot in his business in which he stored
certain property including 3 cans near a tool shed \vhich
he had left there for the garbage men to pick up. The
sediment in the discarded cans was lubricating oil that
\ras non-explosive and would not burn below 365 degrees
fahrenheit. On the oecasion in question two boys, ages 5
and 8, \Vent on the lot, found the cans, and proceeded to
amuse themselves by dropping matches in the cans. They
at first only smoldered, but then one of the children
poured the contents of another can into a 5 gallon oil can
and then dropped matches, following which an explosion
occurred. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. On
appeal it was held that the proximate cause of the aecident was the intervening act of the other children.
One of the tests of proximate cause is whether the
act could reasonably have been foreseen by the defendants. \\T e do not believe that the defendants could reasonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ably foresee that a 14-year old boy in the seventh grade
of school would enter the premises and attempt to set a
fire in or about the Sealtex drum. The leaving of the
drum of Sealtex on the premises was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
(d) THE DOCTRINE IN ANY EVENT CAN ONLY
APPLY T;O CHILDREN OF TENDER AND IMMATURE
YEARS.

The plaintiff rninor 'vas not a child of tender years
to whom the doctrine could in any event apply. See Bogdon v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Ra£lroa.d Co., 59 lTtah 505,
205 Pac. 571, wherein it is said:
"The doctrine underlying the 'turntable' cases
is that the leaving or maintaining of a dangerous
and attractive machine, or other instrument or
agency, upon one's pTemises, under circu1nstances
"\\Thich naturally tend to attract or allure you,ng
chvldren of i'mmature ju.dgntent, and to induce
them to believe that they are at liberty to enter
and handle or play "~ith it is tanta1nount to an
implied invitation to enter.~' (Italics ours.)
See Moseley v. Kansas City (I(an.) 228 Pac. (2d)
699. In that case action \vas brought for the \Yrongful
death of a minor when he climbed an electric light pole
and obtained a charge of electricity producing his death.
The minor was 16 years of age, but it \Yas alleged was of
''low intelligence quotient, of back\\rard and arrested
mentality, which \Vas that of an ordinary child of 12 or
13 years. He had just finished the 8th grade of the public
schools and in both the 7th and 8th grade had been suitable only for and carried in the lo\v grade classes." Dem-
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urrers \vere filed by the defendants ang _were overruled,
from which an appeal was taken. The Kansas Supreme
Court in reversing the statement and sustaining the demurrer said :
The attractive nuisance doctrine, recognized
by the federal courts and by the courts of son1e
(not all) of the states, including l(ansas, is a modification of the general rules of liability for negligence and applies only to a child of •tender years/
in which the child is a trespasser, at least in a
technical sense, but is excused from the normal
liability of a trespasser because of an attractive
obje·ct or situation, dangerous if used or handled
by children who by reason of their tender years
lack capacity to know or realize the danger of
being about or handling the attractive object or
condition. It does not apply to adults. ~r either
does ~t apply to children old enough to know the
possible danger involved. The term 'tender years'
never has been defined in exact years and months,
but ~"n the overwhelming majority of juris.dvct~ons,
where the doctrine is used, it i·s rarely applied in
the case of a child more than ten years of age. In
a relatively few instances, each dealing \vith an unusual situation, the doctrine has been applied to a
child of the age of eleven, twelve, thirteen or fourteen years of age. The courts 1tniversally hold
that the doctrine is not applicable to ,a normal child
more than fourteen ye.ars of age. The fact that a
ch~ld, older than the normal age to which the doctrine is applied, has been backward in his work at
school is not deemed sufficient to include the child
within the .doctrine, unless there vs a show~ng that
the backwardness im his studies iJs the result of
mental impairment or deficiency." (Italics ours)
4

'
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See also P.ayne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598,
221 Pac. 568. In that case the minor involved at the time
of the accident was 14 years and 8 months of age. The
Supreme Court of Utah said:
"It may indeed be seriously questioned
whether a lad of plaintiff's age and mentality may
avail himself of the doctrine here involved; but
we think that certainly he cannot under the peculiar facts in this case. ***"
In the present case Eddie Hoogland \Yas 14 years
of age at the time of the aecident. He was a student in the
7th grade at the Webster Schol and would have started
Junior High School the next year.
At page 19 of appellant's brief mention is made of
an affidavit setting forth that the plaintiff's mental age
was less than 8 years. vVe find no such document or affidavit on file, and in any event, such affidavit would have
to be by a person competent to give such testimony. This
same contention was raised in the Kansas case of Moseley
v. Kansas O~ty, supTa, and in that case the Kansas court
had held that even though a 14 year old hoy \vas backward in his work at school, this ".,.as not sufficient to include the child \vithin the doctrine, unless there \Yas a
showing that the backwardness in his studies "~as the
result of mental iinpairinent or deficiency. There is nothing in the record at all to indicate that this child \ras
mentally backward or deficient. It \vas incumbent upon
the plaintiff to avoid a sumn1ary judgment on this ground
to produce by eo1npetent affidavit by someone qualified
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to testify that Eddie Hoogland was mentally deficient
or back\va.rd.
The answers in his deposition show hi1n to have been
a nor1nal and a bright boy. Furthermore, in his deposition hP testified that he thought "there might be something dangerous" in the barrel. Notwithstanding such
kno\vledge, he allegedly lit a match and held it about 5
inches over an opening in the barrel, at which time he saw
so1ne black, shiny stuff. He then stated he knew that it
\Vas dangerous and wanted to put the match out, thereby
indicating that he knew that a match, if applied to a
dangerous substance, could produce disastrous consequences. All of this knowledge he had prior to the time
that he lit the match. Notwithstanding the fact that he
thought the contents of the barrel might be dangerous,
and knowing that a match applied to a dangerous substance could prove hazardous, he nonetheless applied a
1natch to the contents. This is certainly not the case of a
child of tender years doing something without kno\vledge
or appreciation of the hazard involved. Before he ever
lit the 1natch, this 14 year old boy thought it might be
dangerous, but, nonetheless, did so. Eddie was old enough
to realize that he had done something wrong when he
entered the ·Child premises without permission, because
when he sa\v a man coming out, ''he just hid behind soinething." (H. 20). Under these circumstances the attractive
nuisance doctrine cannot and should not apply.
See also B~anan v. Wimsatt (District of ~Columbia)
298 Fed. 833, in which the Federal District Court of ApSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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peals stated that the attractive nuisance doctrine "excludes minors who have reached the age of discretion,
or, who, knowing the hazard, assume the risk of doing
that which will imperil their lives or limbs. In so holding
we do no more than has been done by the majority of the
states which have dealt "rith such matters, and by the
Supreme Court itself.''
In Belt R. Co. v. Charters, 123 Ill. Appeal322, it was
stated that in practically every instance where the attractive nuisance doctrine was applied it involved children
less than 10 years of age and incapable of exercising
ordinary care.
See also lianna v. Iowa C. R. Co., 129 Ill. Appeal134,
in which it was held that the presumption that a 12 year
old boy had the capacity to comprehend the dangers he
incurs in going upon a floating log on a pond which he
had visited on previous occasions was held not overcome
by a showing that he was of humble parentage, that he
was reared in a home possessing few books, of little culture, and that he 'vas behind the average child of his age
in studies.
The cases of Keck v. Woodring, 208 Pac. (2d) 1133,
and Mosely v. J(ansas City, 228 Pac. (2d) 843, supra, page
32, cited by counsel in support of his position both involve situations where the attractive nuisance doctrine
as a matter of law was held not applicable because the
minor was not of tender years.
The case of Missouri Pacific Rai:Zroad Co. v. Lester,
242 S.W. (2d) 71± cited by appellant involved a child ·5
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years of age who ,,~as injured by a fire which the defendant's e1nployees had built in an alley and later abandoned.
The defendant's employees knew that the minor plaintiff
"~as around the fire when they left. This case is certainly
not in point.
The case of J( entucky Uti~Zities Co. v. Earles A_d'Jni£nistrator, 2~ S.W. (2d) 929, cited by appellant is definitely against the proposition claimed by the appellant.
In that case a boy 5 months beyond his 14th birthday \vas
killed vvhen he came in contact with a power line 48 feet
above the ground on the power company's pole. The court
held that the boy was a trespasser and that the administrator could not recover for wilful death on the theory
of attractive nuisance because that doctrine did not a pply to a boy who had attained his 14th birthday even
".-here there was evidence that the boy's school grades
1night have been below norn1al, that he had been compelled
to take the 4th grade over, and that he 'vas in the 8th
grade at school.
POIN'T IV.
THE ACCIDENT AS A MATTER OF LAW WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AND CARELESSNESS OF THE PLAINTIFF MINOR.

As previously indicated in con~ection with our discussion under point III (d), to which reference is hereby
made, the plaintiff minor was not a child of tender years.
He vvas in fact 14 years of age. A review of his deposition shows him to be a normal, intelligent individual.
Furthermore his deposition conclusively indicates that
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after he trespassed upon the premises of Thomas B. Child
and eventually came in contact with the drum, that he
thought it might be dangerous, but, nonetheless and notwithstanding such knowledge, he lit a match to it and had
previously lit a fire and torch around it with full knowledge and appreciation of the danger of so doing. His own
testimony shows that he appreciated the danger, but,
nonetheless, took an affirmative act in lighting a 1natch,
a torch and a fire and thereby through his O\Yn act, done
with knowledge of the possible dangerous consequences,
brought about his own injury. He was therefore guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of la\Y which
should preclude his recovery.
POINT V.
THE PLAINTIFF MINOR WAS A TRESPASSER AS TO
WHOM THE DEFENDANTS OWED NO DUTY EX·CEPT AS
NOT 'TO WILFULLY CAUSE ANY INJURY.

As a matter of la\\'" the evidence disclosed that the
plaintiff minor was not an invitee or licensee, but a trespasser upon the premises of Thomas B. Child at the
time of the accident. Under such circumstances there

• part of the defendants \\'"hatsoever
was no duty upon the
to the plaintiff except to refrain fro1n \vilfully injuring
the plaintiff. There is no evidence in this case \vhatsoever that the defendants "\\rilfully caused any injury to
the plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiff minor clearly "'\vas a trespasser upon the
premises. He knew that he was doing wrong when he
entered the premises. He thought the drum might contain
a dangerous substance, but nonetheless lit a match thereto. There '"ere no markings on the Sealtex to indicate
it \Vas dangerous, explosive or flammable. There was
nothing in the experience of the defendants Alder and
Child to indicate any danger. In factJ it was all to the
contrary. To hold the defendants liable in a case of this
type is to make them insurers against injury from anybody 'vho may come upon their premises and start or
light fires. This "'\vould extend the liability of the defendants beyond all reason. In this day and age many products are stored in garages and upon pre1nises which are
not marked dangerous, explosive or flammable. If the
O"\vner is to be charged with knowledge of the chemical
contents of such products and to be charged with notice
that some child may enter his premises and attempt to
set fire or light matches to such articles, we then submit
that the owner of the premises becornes an absolute guarantor and must at his peril know the chemical analysis of
any product stored or kept upon his premises and must
at his peril ascertain whether such product may cause
injury to someone who may come upon his premises and
make an unusual or extraordinary use of said article.
We sub1nit that the defendants did not store a dangerous or explosive product upon the premises; that if
there was any danger, it was not lmown to the defendants.
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It was only in connection with the action taken by the
plaintiff minor in lighting a match and building a fire
that the accident occurred. Such action could not reasonably have been foreseen by the defendants. The motion
of the defendants Alder and Child for summary judgment
was properly granted.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG

Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents Alder Child
Construction Company
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